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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate security issues and 
challenges facing researchers in wireless sensor networks and 
countermeasures to resolve them. The broadcast nature of wireless 
communication makes Wireless Sensor Networks prone to various 
attacks. Due to resources limitation constraint in terms of limited 
energy, computation power and memory, security in wireless sensor 
networks creates different challenges than wired network security. 
We will discuss several attempts at addressing the issues of security 
in wireless sensor networks in an attempt to encourage more research 
into this area. 
 
Keywords—Malicious nodes, network security, soft encryption, 
threats, wireless sensor networks. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
IRELESS sensor networks are composed of large 
numbers of tiny devices, which are called motes [9]. 
Each mote has the capability of sensing its environment, 
computing, and communicating data to other motes until 
reaching the base station which is linked to cloud storage 
where data are made available to authorized users. 
As can be seen in Fig. 1, a complete wireless sensor 
network usually consists of a number of sensor nodes for 
collecting data depending on the application and passes that 
data to a base station. 
Sensor nodes are used to measure physical quantities such 
as temperature, gas, position, humidity, pressure and so on 
depending on the application. However, wireless sensor 
networks have a number of vulnerabilities, which may be 
exploited by hackers to gain access to the network to steal data 
or tamper with it [11].  
In this paper, we discuss possible security threats for 
wireless sensor networks and investigate possible solutions. 
 
 
Fig. 1 Wireless Sensor Network Concept 
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II. ASPECTS OF WSN SECURITY 
Wireless sensor networks are a special type of wireless 
network which share common security requirements with 
other networks such as confidentiality, integrity, 
authentication and availability, which need to be addressed 
during protocol design [7].  Data Confidentiality: Ensures that only authorised 
sensor nodes can access the content of the collected data. 
The data may be highly sensitive as in the case of military 
applications. 
The best approach for keeping sensitive data secret is to use 
symmetric encryption with a secret key that only the intended 
nodes possess [6].   Data Authentication: Ensures that the data are originated 
from the correct source. Data authentication allows the 
receiving node to verify that the data received is sent by a 
trusted node. For example, in the case of two-node 
communications, data authentication can be achieved by 
using a shared secret key to compute the message 
authentication code of all communicated data.  Data Integrity: Ensures that any received data have not 
been tampered with by an unauthorized node. For 
example, a malicious node may add some packets or 
modify data within a packet before forwarding the corrupt 
data to its neighbour.  Availability : Ensures that services offered by the whole 
wireless sensor network or by a single sensor node must 
be available whenever required.  Data Freshness: Even if confidentiality and data integrity 
have been achieved it is imperative to ensure that no old 
data have been replayed. This requirement of fresh data is 
important when dealing with shared-keys which need to 
be changed over time. 
III. TYPE OF ATTACKS IN WSN 
The broadcast nature of wireless sensor networks 
communication with their limitations in energy, computational 
power and memory of these tiny sensors, render WSNs 
susceptible to link attacks ranging from passive eavesdropping 
to message reply and message modification. The major attacks 
against wireless sensor networks could be summarised below. 
A. Denial of Service Attack (DoS) 
In wireless sensor networks, there are several types of DoS 
attacks depending on the protocol layers [8] as shown below: 
Physical layer: DoS attack creates a radio signal that 
interferes with the radio frequencies being used by the sensor 
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networks [8] as shown in Fig. 2. Jamming a wireless sensor 
network can render the entire network inactive and useless. 
Data Link Layer: Continually transmitting messages in an 
attempt to create collisions, which cause the retransmission of 
the affected packets. This eventually depletes a sensor node’s 
power supply and renders it inactive. 
Network Layer: Neglect and greed, misdirection, black 
hole. 
Transport Layer: Malicious flooding by sending many 
connection requests to a susceptible node, this eventually 
exhausts the node’s resources, thus rendering the node useless. 
 
 
Fig. 2 DoS Attack at the physical layer 
B. Sybil Attack 
This concept was proposed by Douceur in P2P networks [3] 
and is defined as a malicious node taking multiple identities to 
confuse neighbour nodes, causing chaos among them which 
leads to breakdown of the entire network, as shown in Fig. 1. 
Sybil attacks pose a significant threat to geographic routing 
protocols. During this routing, protocol nodes are required to 
exchange location information with their neighbours to 
efficiently route geographically addressed packets. It is 
reasonable to expect a node to accept a single unique set of 
coordinates from each of its neighbours. However, using the 
Sybil attack, an adversary appears to be in more than one 
place at once. 
 
 
Fig. 3 Sybil node in WSN 
C. Selective Forwarding 
In a selective forwarding attack, a malicious node may 
refuse to forward certain packets of data and simply drop 
them, ensuring that they are not propagated any further. 
A simple form of this attack is when a malicious node 
selectively forwards packets. An attacker suppresses or 
modifies packets originating from selected nodes and forwards 
the remaining traffic. Selective forwarding attacks are most 
effective when the attacker is explicitly included on the data 
flow path. However, it is possible that an adversary 
overhearing a flow passing through neighbouring nodes might 
be able to emulate selective forwarding by jamming each 
forwarded packet of interest. 
D. Blackhole/Sinkhole attack 
In a sinkhole attacks, a malicious node acts as blackhole [2] 
to attract all the traffic in the sensor network through a 
compromised node creating a metaphorical sinkhole with the 
adversary at the centre as depicted in Fig. 4. 
 
 
Fig. 4 Blackhole/Sinkhole Attacks 
E. Wormhole Attack 
One of the most serious attacks in wireless sensor networks 
is the wormhole attack. It is hard to detect because the attack 
does not create abnormal traffic into the network [4]. 
In order to launch a wormhole attack, an adversary connects 
two distant nodes in the network using a direct low-latency 
communication link called the wormhole link. As shown in 
Fig. 5, once the wormhole link is established, the adversary 
captures data packets at one node (S9) and sends them through 
the wormhole link to a node another location (S2) and replays 
them at the other node. 
The tunnel creates the illusion that the two end nodes are 
very close to each other by making tunnelled packets reach the 
destination node with fewer hops compared to the packets sent 
over normal routes. This allows an attacker to control several 
routes within the network and permit or deny data traffic to his 
advantage. 
The counter-measure for the wormhole attack can be 
implemented at different layers. For example, in this research 
paper [5], it was suggested using directional antennas at the 
media access layer and packet leashes at the Network layer. 
This technique is called ‘packet leashes’ and overcomes 
wormhole attacks by restricting the maximum distance of the 
transmission, using either tight time synchronisation or 
location information.  
 
 
Fig. 5 Wormhole Attack 
  
F. Hello Flood Attack 
In Hello Flood Attack, a malicious person uses a laptop 
with high radio transmission and unlimited power to send 
HELLO packets to a number of sensor nodes to pretend to be 
their neighbours. As a consequence, the victim nodes go 
through the laptop when sending data to the base station and 
are ultimately spoofed by the attacker as shown in Fig. 6. 
 
 
Fig. 6 Hello Flood Attack 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
Three types of research methods are used for evaluating the 
performance of wireless networks [1]:  physical measurement, 
analytical methods, and network simulation. 
In this research paper, a network simulator called ns2 is 
selected as it is currently the best-known network simulation 
package for research into wireless networks [10]. NS-2 is 
written in C++, which uses MIT’s Object Tool Command 
Language (OTcl) as the command and configuration interface. 
The simulator is invoked via the ns interpreter and the OTcl 
scripts defined the simulation rules. NS-2 provides substantial 
support for the simulation of TCP/ UDP, routing, multicast 
protocols over both wired and wireless, local and satellite 
network. 
Currently ns-2 is being developed by the Virtual Inter 
Network Test-bed (VINT) group, which is supported by the 
Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). 
V. IMPLEMENTATION 
In this research, a network of 70 sensor nodes operating 
under the Dynamic Source Routing protocol have been 
simulated in an area of 700x700m using simulation times of 
100, 200, 300, and 500 seconds. During the simulation, the 
misbehaving nodes were selected randomly at different 
percentages of the total number of nodes (i.e. 10%, 20%, 30%, 
40%, and 50%) which is represented by the horizontal axis of 
the graphs in Figs. 7-10. 
The performance of the network is measured using four 
parameters (throughput, packet delivery ratio, number of 
packets dropped and average delay). Each parameter is 
measured in three separate scenarios: 
1. Network under normal operation (i.e. without malicious 
nodes). 
2. Network with deployment of several malicious nodes 
3. Network with implementation of soft-encryption to deal 
with malicious nodes [12]. 
VI. RESULTS 
In this simulation the four parameters (packet delivery ratio 
(PDR), throughput, packet dropped, average delay) have been 
measured and results in the form of graphs have been shown 
below: 
A. Packet Delivery Ratio: 
From Fig. 7, it is obvious that the performance of the 
network protocol DSR based on packet delivery ratio is better 
with soft encryption than without any security mechanism in 
all the misbehaving nodes. 
 
 
Fig. 7 Packet Delivery Ratio in the three scenarios 
B. Throughput: 
Fig. 8 shows that the throughput performance metric is 
slightly better for the DSR with soft encryption than without 
it.  
This improvement is expected because the soft encryption 
algorithm helps neutralize the effect of misbehaving nodes. 
However, the DSR performance with soft encryption is still 
less than the normal DSR. 
 
 
Fig. 8 Throughput measurement in the three scenarios 
C. Packets Loss 
Fig. 9 shows that the performance DSR regarding packet 
loss perform better than the DSR without any form of security. 
The highest number of packets dropped reached 5732 at 
50% of misbehaving nodes, while in the case of DSR without 
a security solution reached more than 6000 packets at the 
same rate. 
  
 
Fig. 9 Packet Loss in the three scenarios 
D. Average Delay 
Fig. 10 shows interesting results, as the average delay is 
higher in DSR with soft encryption than without it, which is 
expected as the algorithm takes time to be executed. 
 
 
Fig. 10 Average delay in scenario 2 and scenario 3 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Security is an important issue in wireless sensor network as 
hackers are finding new ways to intercept data during their 
exchange between senor nodes in order to steal or tamper it  
In this research, a new security technique called ‘soft 
encryption has been investigated based on trust between 
sensor nodes.  
The performance of the Dynamic Source Routing protocol 
degrades rapidly with the increase of malicious nodes within 
the network. However, the implementation of soft-encryption 
technique proved to detect these malicious nodes and reduces 
their effect. 
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